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The Origin of Humans 
by 
Helen Watt, Ph.D. 
The author is Research Fellow, Linacre Centrejor Health Care Ethics, London. 
It can be claimed that the human moral subject - the "human being" or 
"human person" - is to be identified with something more or less familiar : the 
living human organism. The aim of this paper is not to defend this claim, although 
I think it can be defended. The aim is rather to establish what is required, 
assuming this claim is accepted, for it to be the case that a human person - a 
human organism - has come into existence. I will begin, however, with a brief 
description of a theory on which the human person is the organism, before 
seeking to establish what the organism is, and when it first comes into being. 
What I will call the "organic" theory does not presuppose an addition, or 
substitution, of which there is no sign. It does not presuppose that the living body 
is joined by a separate soul or person. Rather than the embryo or fetus being 
joined or replaced by such another entity, the embryo and fetus is the person at an 
early stage of his or her existence. The same person - that is to say, the same 
human animal - is first unable, then able to move, feel, think, and so on. These 
are abilities acquired by the animal, not ascribable to some alternative entity. I 
Such abilities are therefore not essential to our being here at all. 
The organic theory confirms the intuition held by many that our human moral 
status is inalienable. That is to say, there are no humans existing with some 
inferior status, but every human has human moral status for as long as he or she 
exists. We have objective interests in certain benefits - both short - and longer 
- term - which are morally important between our conscious moments, and 
before any such moment can occur. The result is not that all human beings - any 
more than all adults - have the same set of rights, but is rather that all human 
beings have their own (though overlapping) sets of rights, as moral subjects of 
importance. As the entity which lives, grows and (eventually) thinks and talks, 
the human organism is, prima jacie, the obvious candidate for human status. In 
view of this, we should identify the organism as accurately as we can. 
Potential and Human Fertilization 
An organism - human or non-human - cannot be described without 
reference to "potential": a term often used, though in widely differing senses, in 
the context ofhuman reproduction. It should be noted that the potential m<N characteristic 
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of an organism is not a passive potential, of the kind a stick has to be split, or a cell 
to be cloned. Rather, it is an active potential of that organism 2 to initiate changes 
in itself in the appropriate environMent. Active potential refers to continuity 
between not doing, and doing, on the part of an individual. It is with reference to 
active potential that we distinguish the living from the dead, and living parts such 
as skin cells (which have some active tendencies) from living wholes or organisms 
(which have others). All living wholes have the active potential, which they 
retain throughout their existence, to direct their own activities in ways relating to 
their own well-being. 
Fertilization, in the sense of sperm entry, is often singled out as the point of 
departure for the life-cycle of a higher animal. However, this view has, of course, 
been contested, in relation to humans in particular. During sperm entry, when the 
sperm has passed within the zona pellucida enveloping the ovum, the sperm and 
ovum membranes open to each other, and the inside of the sperm is released into 
the cytoplasm of the ovum.3 Stephen Buckle, Karen Dawson and Peter Singer'" 
among others, have argued that there is no "moment" of fertilization during the 
process of sperm entry. The sperm, they say, remains identifiable even after 
entering the cytoplasm. The genetic material in the head of the sperm remains 
intact, forming the male pronucleus. Just as Siamese twins are two distinct 
entities contained within one body, so, they say, the male pronucleus is distinct 
from - although contained within - the ovum. The ovum before the lining-up 
at syngamy of the male and female chromosomes is not, these writers claim, 
genetically unified, however else it is unified. 
Theories differ over whether human beings come into existence by degrees. 
There are, of course, entities which do this: for example, aggregates, such as piles 
of sand, and artifacts, such as cars. Living things, which are self-directing, are 
more than aggregates of other things. And one of the differences between 
organisms and artifacts is that while the latter are characterized with reference to 
the end-product - that is, to the aims of the producer - the former are 
characterized with reference to current active tendencies (which may relate to 
longer-term developments) and corresponding internal goods. The presence or 
absence of the defining tendencies of a being of this kind at this stage of 
development is what makes such a being either present or absent. An organism is 
a living whole, as opposed to a living part, and for this reason cannot come into 
existence by degrees. With regard to syngamy, it is not easy to link the 
appearance of such a living whole with any stage in the lining-up of 
chromosomes present in the cell since the entry of the sperm. 
The single-cell embryo has, before syngamy, and the previous disintegration of 
the nuclear envelopes, not one but two genetic centers: the male and female 
pronuclei. The co-ordinated activity of these genetic centers, within the one cell 
membrane, prepares for later activity which must in any case be ascribed to the 
organism itself. The male and female pronuclei work within one cell for common 
ends; for the good of one organism. (In the case of Siamese twins, in contrast, two 
brains - two centers of control - give directions of which many relate to parts 
not shared by the twins: for example, their separate faces.) The formation and 
acti vity of the two pronuclei , together with previous signs of 
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activation, are indications that the cell is working as a living whole geared 
towards further development. 
Moreover, whether or not a living whole comes into being on completion of 
sperm entry, it is not possible to claim that the sperm remains indentifiable on 
completion of sperm entry. For during sperm entry, the sperm is broken up, not 
simply enveloped by the ovum. The inside of the sperm, in entering the 
cytoplasm, leaves the membrane behind to be absorbed in due course, as the 
incorporated portion of the tail is absorbed, while the male pronucleus forms 
from the nucleus of the sperm. The sperm cannot be identified with its contents. 
Even should we want to deny that the contents of the sperm turn at once into 
parts of a new living entity, we must acknowledge that the sperm has been 
dismantled in delivering material to the ovum. 
If sperm entry is regarded as involving at least the destruction of the sperm, we 
should ask if we can identify a decisive point of discontinuity during the process 
of sperm entry. I would place this at the point at which the inside of the sperm has 
passed entirely into the cytoplasm of the ovum5, and has separated entirely from 
the membrane of the sperm, which remains embedded in what is now the 
membrane of the zygote. We should follow our normal practice of singling out a 
new (sub)entity when some part of the old is disconnected from its (sizeable) 
neighbor, and is not now behaving as if it were the pre-existing entity. As for the 
zygote, it is spatially more continous with the ovum than the inside of the sperm is 
with the sperm. Discontinuity is, however, quite dramatically signalled in the 
case of the zygote by the advent of developmental powers. 
An Origin After Sperm Entry and Syngamy 
Some writers, while admitting that the zygote is a separate individual from the 
ovum, deny that the organism can be traced to the appearance of the zygote, 
whenever this takes place. Norman Ford6, for example, has argued that a new 
individual comes into existence at syngamy, but that this individual is not 
continuous with the later human organism. The zygote, after all, splits into two: a 
process which it cannot survive. Then again, can we see as an individual the 
dividing group of cells within the zona pellucida? And can we claim that the 
group of cells is continuous with the body of, say, the 14-day embryo, if sites are 
not yet marked out for parts of this body, and if cells are not yet differentiated, 
and can be used to form any part of the "embryo proper", the accessory tissues 
(the umbilical cord, the placenta) or can indeed be separated off to form new 
embryos, or combined with other cells to form chimeras? 
With regard to Ford's claim that first cell division marks a break in continuity, 
it can be objected that the cells resulting from division are neither spatially nor 
functionally separate, but rather work as parts of one whole, pressed together 
within a single zona pellucida. 71t is by reference to functional unity that normal 
mitotic division can be contrasted with early twinning, giving rise to two 
independent organisms, still within one zona pellucida. 8 In the case of a single 
embryo not only is there co-operation between constituent cells of the organism9, 
but developments such as cell differentiation are only possible because the cells of 
the early embryo act in such a way as to give rise to these developments. 
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"Totipotency" of cells is, in fact , a precondition of later differentiation, which 
does not arise accidentally, but is prepared for by the activity ofthe early embryo. 
To Ford's further point that parts of the eai-Iy embryo are not spatiotemporally 
continuous with corresponding parts of the later organism 10, it can be objected 
that parts are continuous with those which immediately precede them, so that the 
later whole is continuous with all stages of the earlier whole. The change in form 
should not be seen as decisive; elsewhere in biology we are prepared to 
countenance significant variations both of bulk and of form under the relevant 
covering concept. II Such tissues as the placenta should be included in the later 
whole into which the earlier whole develops, since these tissues, like the milk 
teeth after birth, are a temporary body part of immature humans. The placenta 
can, of course, be shared by twins - as other organs can be shared by Siamese 
twins. The placenta can be genetically different from the rest of the embryo - as 
can other parts of the embryo.12 The fact that many cells of the early embryo will 
give rise to so-called "extra-embryonic" tissues is evidence for , not against, the 
continuous existence of an organism which first grows and then discards what is 
needed for a phase of its development. 13 
With regard to the point that totipotent cells can be separated off to form new 
embryos or chimeras, it can be argued that the fact that a part of a whole might 
contribute material to another whole does not mean that this part is not now a 
genuine part of the original whole. If an ovum is a part of a woman before 
contributing material to an embryo, something similar can be said about an 
embryonic cell which may be isolated and activated in some new direction. If 
such a cell were activated so as to give rise to (rather than contribute to) an 
embryo, the tendency after activation to develop as a separate individual could be 
seen as indicating a substantial change from the cell to the embryo. The earlier 
passive potential of the cell to be isolated by outside intervention does not mean 
that the embryo it comes from has the active potential to produce a new embryo, 
much less to be a new embryo. The mere possibility of twinning or combining 
does not suffice to show that the embryo is not a human organism: that is to say, 
an entity with human self-directive tendencies, or (as some describe it) a human 
"life-principle", or soul. 14 
Twinning Tendencies and Twinning Propensities 
Where twinning casts more serious doubt on the previous existence of a 
human organism is where there seems to be an inherent tendency - or, at least, 
an inherent propensity - to symmetric twinning. If the early embryo is defined 
by tendencies which include the tendency to form some later type of body, then 
what are we to say ifthere are embryos with the tendency to form not one but two 
of this type of body? Twinning may occur so early that any potential, for 
example, to differentiate cells along a certain pattern will be carried out by two 
and not by one. We may be unable to identify the original individual with one 
twin rather than its sibling. Are we, then, to suppose that this individual dies in 
giving rise to two descendants? 
For the zygote which does not twin, first cell-division does not involve 
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disintegration of the zygote. Rather, a constituent cell produces new constituent 
cells, working in the interests of the whole. In contrast there is evidence of 
twinning if two segmentation cavities appear within the zona pellucida, or if at 
some later stage there are two inner cell masses, two amniotic cavities or two 
embryonic discs. It should be noted that monozygotic twins may develop within 
a single zona, and then together in one blastocyst - as indeed non-identical, 
dizygotic twins may sometimes develop within a single zona, and then together in 
one blastocyst, after the dispermic fertilization of two cells resulting from division 
of an unfertilized ovum. 15 
Where there is evidence of symmetric twinning, it would appear that the 
dividing individual has ceased to exist, giving rise to two physically distinct 
(though perhaps adjacent) organisms. In such a case there is radical disruption of 
the original organism, such that neither resulting individual can be 
spatiotemporally continuous with that original organism. If, on the other hand, 
one cell is removed by a scientist from a multi-cell embryo, as in embryo biopsy, 
it would appear that a new entity has been generated - an embryo or not, 
depending on its tendencies - without sufficient disruption to entail the death of 
the original embryo. In the same way, if an adult cell of mine could be cloned to 
produce another person, this would not mean that in losing this part of my body I 
ceased to exist, nor that prior to cloning I was more than one person. The case of 
symmetric twinning can be compared, in contrast, to a case in which I am split 
into all my component cells, each one of which is then cloned. 16 Clearly, in such a 
case I cease to exist as an organism: an individual living whole. My remains, like 
those of the dividing embryo, do not constitute a normal corpse, but the bodies of 
my living descendants. 
Ford suggests at one point that all zygotes have the "natural active potential" to 
twin.17 However, this does not appear to be the case; if it were, all zygotes would 
eventually make themselves twin, unless deprived of the appropriate 
environment. The fact that all zygotes could be made to twin (for example, by 
researchers) does not show that all zygotes have an active tendency to twin. Even 
in the case of an atypical conceptus, we should be careful not to misidentify an 
active tendency to twin. IS For example, we can imagine an embryo, or apparent 
embryo, with some acquired or inherent weakness such that in some 
environments it would be made to twin, while in others it would not. A mere 
inherent susceptibility to environmental pressures is not enough to constitute an 
active tendency - though if there is no environment in which "development" 
could take place after a certain point without being interrupted by twinning, then 
the entity certainly lacks the tendency, which may be decisive, to produce a single 
line of development after that point. If, on the other hand, it were known (as it is 
not) that symmetric l9 twinning in certain rare cases were part of some internal 
programl~ then we might have to postulate the existence in such cases not of a 
real human organism or person but of - to use a term of Warren Quinn's21 - a 
"proto-organism". Such an entity would survive until such time as the program 
were carried out, or alternatively, until such time as the program, having been 
thwarted, could no longer be carried out, at which point the advent of 
developmental tendencies would signify the advent of a genuine human 
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organism. The program to twin would in some sense give rise to the program of 
the embryo to develop; however, these programs would be different enough to 
mark their bearers off as different things. If an embryo is defined by its active 
tendency to produce its own development, it would be wrong to call anything an 
embryo which tended rather to produce its own early destruction. 
Just as an embryo might arise from what was not an embryo, developmental 
tendencies can be absent in an entity arising from an embryo. We can imagine a 
situation in which an embryo was subjected to some outside intervention, so that 
the resulting entity was placed on the point of twinning, which it would do 
without further intervention. If the entity were unable to develop, not just in its 
actual environment, but in any environment, then this would not be a living 
human embryo, but the remains of an embryo. Adult humans, of course, remain 
alive and human at times when they have only very short-term active tendencies: 
that is, when their imminent death is guaranteed by their physical condition. 
However, the organizational tendencies which characterize very immature 
human beings include their developmental tendencies: the tendencies which link 
their current stage of life to every later stage, and which they cannot lose and 
survive. 
The implications for identity of any active tendency to twin in what appeared 
to be an embryo would depend on what active tendency, to produce what form 
of activity, is required for the presence of an early human. We will return to this 
question shortly. In the meantime, we should note the suggestion sometimes 
made that if an embryo has the tendency to twin then it consists in reality of two 
individuals, temporarily occupying the same space.22 The dualist implications of 
this view are surely sufficient to exclude it. For since the same piece of space-time 
would be "occupied" by each person, the two would originally be physically 
indistinguishable. We would have to imagine two life-principles which somehow 
animate one body in unison, before moving on to animate two separate bodies, 
when these are eventually produced. Nor is it possible to claim that twins 
resulting from one zygote share one initial history - as opposed to one 
precondition of their coming into being. For this would be a violation of the 
transitivity of identity: the twins, not identical with each other, cannot both be 
identical with something else. 23 Different problems would arise if twins were 
present "together" from the outset, but separate development could somehow be 
prevented until a stage at which it was no longer possible. In this case, we would 
have to say either that one or other twin had died - without there being any 
physical basis for the death of one rather than the other - or worse, that both 
twins were present as before, although they would never be physically 
distinguishable. 
If a human is an organism each human must be a separate self-directing entity. 
The presence of a single set of twinning directions (or twinning propensities) in 
the conceptus would not be enough to indicate the presence at that point of two 
separate foci of control. Rather, it would indicate the presence of an active 
tendency (or passive liability) on the part of that conceptus. For evidence of the 
presence of two individuals we will need to find evidence, as in the case of 
Siamese twins, of separate physical activities directed by separate foci of control. 
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The phenomenon of identical twinning indicates that it is not, as is sometimes 
claimed, the genome itself which is the unique, essential constituent of the person. 
Nor can this even be said of an instance of a genome; say, that of one of a pair of 
identical twins. For it is counterintuitive that any alteration to the genome - any 
more than to some other part of the body - would bring about the destruction of 
the original individual, and the generation of a new one. Even a major alteration 
to the genome would not entail the destruction of the original individual if there 
were present after the alteration a living being who retained the relevant human 
tendencies. 
Human Offspring and Human Products 
What would be a genetic aberration of a kind incompatible with the existence 
of a human? For clearly, we must distinguish between human offspring, and 
what are no more than human products. Examples of the latter are complete 
hydatiform moles, formed with no maternal genetic contribution and producing 
extraembryonic tissue; and teratomas, which can produce a jumble of 
disorganized tissues (teeth, skin, etc).24 Both these entities are genetically unique 
and, in a sense, alive and human. Neither, however, is human offspring. Why is 
this? 
Some would say that what they lack is rational potential; that is, in the context 
of early development, the tendency to organize themselves in such a way as to 
develop rational abilities. In other words, if one precursor of rationality, such as 
the fetal or infant brain, can be said to suffice for personhood, then an earlier 
precursor in the embryo can equally be said to suffice. 25 The normal embryo. 
fetus and infant has, at every stage, the acti ve tendency to develop rational 
abilities. when appropriately cared fo r. Is this tendency essential to - or merely 
typical of - the immature human organism? 
As yet it is not clear what causes anencephaly: the condition due to which 
infants are born with a working brainstem but with a badly disorganized upper 
brain. It has been claimed that rather than anencephaly resulting from a failure in 
neural tube formation, it may result, at least sometimes, from degeneration of a 
previously normal neural tube.26 Should this be so, it would not alter the fact that 
anencephalies are born without an active tendency to develop rational abilities, 
whether or not they once had the epigenetic primordia of a healthy human brain. 
In view of this fact, should we regard anencephalies, despite the features which 
they share with normal infants, as human products, like hydatiform moles? 
To return for a moment to the hydatiform mole, it is clear that such an entity 
can be no more a human being than can a culture of skin cells. One indication of 
this is that it seems odd to say that a hydatiform mole, any more than a culture of 
skin cells, ought to have, by any stage, a healthy human brain. A hydatiform 
mole, as a normal hydatiform mole, could not be expected to have any such 
thing. In contrast, the anencephalic baby, though sharing its features with other 
such babies, is not a normal, or healthy baby. We have some idea of what the 
anencephalic is missing; we are able to say what tendencies ought to be there, and 
are not. Moreover, we are able to say what tendencies ought to be there by 
referring to tendencies which are there. A severely damaged infant (or fetus or 
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embryo) will nonetheless have tendencies relating to the organization of many 
features shared by other species members. 
Moreover, such an infant will have some, though not all, of the tendencies it 
needs to develop to maturity. For example, an anencephalic infant has some, 
though not all, of the tendencies it needs to develop adult features. The active 
tendencies it has by virtue of some of its parts cannot form part of a wider active 
tendency to develop adult features, in view of the fact that these active 
"subtendencies" are frustrated by defects in other parts - for example, by defects 
in the control of the cardiovascular and respiratory systems. Not only is the adult 
stage appropriate to the kind to which the infant belongs, but the infant has parts 
by virtue of which it has active tendencies which would have helped it reach that 
stage, were it not for other parts which are blocking or frustrating the action of the 
first. We should distinguish between the active tendency of all humans first to 
develop, and always to integrate their parts; missing "wider" tendencies due to 
one sub-tendency being frustrated through lack of another; and absent tendencies 
where there is and should be no such active sub-tendency. For example,a normal 
male, unlike an infertile woman, has neither the tendency to give birth to a child 
nor any of the specialized sub-tendencies (for example, to produce the relevant 
hormones) which make up this wider tendency. 
What, then, are the tendencies essential to the existence of a human being? I 
have been assuming that the organizational tendencies essential to the existence 
of an early human being include the tendency it has to organize its own 
development. The active tendency to differentiate cells is at least a necessary 
condition for early human life. Mere cell multiplication, without a view to later 
differentiation, would not be human development. If, on the other hand, cells will 
be differentiated to form a head, trunk, and so on, arranged as parts of one body, 
then the conceptus would appear to be a human, at an early point in its 
developmental path. In a case of doubt after some harmful intervention - for 
example, the introduction of non-human cells - we should decide by reference 
to the part of the mature human organism which we would take as sufficient 
evidence of human organization. Those who would accept as sufficient evidence 
the presence of a working human brain might then conclude that an active 
tendency to produce a working human brain would be sufficient to show that the 
conceptus was a human. If a working part of the brain - for example, the 
brainstem - is thought to be sufficient in the case of older human beings, then a 
tendency to form this working part might be taken to show that a conceptus was 
an early human being. 
The active tendency to differentiate cells in an orderly fashion and then to form 
a working human brain, is, I would argue, sufficient indication of the presence of 
an early human being: a living organism which directs itself in characteristic 
human ways. Not only is the human brain the organic "control centre" of the 
mature human organism, but the presence of a human brain, or the tendency to 
produce one, is evidence that the organism is the kind of being which ought, by a 
certain stage, to have rational abilities. A being with a human brain, or the 
tendency to produce one, is a rational kind of being. It is a rational kind of being, 
in one sense or another, whether or not it is the case - if the human "life-principle" 
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is something subsistent27 - that such a being has a non-material basis for many if 
not all the tendencies required for rational behavior. 
The profoundly mentally handicapped can only be described as such because 
they are members of our kind. We believe we have duties to enable, or at very 
least, to permit those not currently rational to attain what we see as their rational 
fulfillment. If we cannot do this, our respect and sympathy - a response 
appropriate to damaged members of our kind - can be shown in other ways. 
The moral and biological class of human beings, which includes normal and 
damaged, mature and immature, is the class not of those with current rational 
abilities, nor even of those with "wider" rational tendencies, but of those whose 
active tendencies constitute them members of our rational kind.28 
Conclusion 
Various areas have been touched on in this paper, without their being given the 
attention they deserve. One final question should however, be raised before 
concluding, which concerns the grounds for the widespread reluctance, even on 
the part of those who think that we are organisms, to accept the embryo's claim to 
be a human organism, and a human being, or person. If we lea ve aside emotional 
pressures which implications of this claim may well create29, the most likely cause 
of our reluctance is arguably the sheer unfamiliarity of at least the early embryo. 
Very little was known about the embryo in previous generations, and even now, 
many of us find our first sight ofthe embryo puzzling, or even alarming. How is it 
possible, we may ask ourselves, that an entity which looks so unfamiliar is one of 
us - a human being? 
Arguments from the "inhuman" appearance of the embryo need to justify their 
central assumption that this is not what human beings look like, at one stage of 
their lives.30 We do, of course, begin the enquiry into our origin with a mental 
picture of the paradigmatic human person: someone with eyes, face, limbs, and so 
on; someone of adult form and appearance. Our enquiry should not focus on 
such features, which are not obviously essential, but should rather focus on what 
persisting entity might underlie these and other features. Biological entities, such 
as we are, are defined not by static but by selj-adaptingstructures and tendencies. 
And while it is true that we trace a human being through time by identifying one 
stage as similar to the next, we should not expect to find greater similarities 
between disparate stages in the case of human beings than we find in the case of 
other animals. 
It may be objected that a familiar appearance is part of our social reality: part 
of what we normally relate to in relating to a human being or person. It is 
undoubtedly the case that we find it easier to relate to those who look like the 
human beings to whom we are accustomed. However, we should not refuse to 
recognize what we have reason to believe is a stage of human life, simply on the 
grounds of unfamiliar appearance, or lack of emotional appeal. After all, a child 
or adult of normal appearance may have much wider emotional appeal than does 
a child or adult with a serious disfigurement. Nonetheless, those with serious 
disfigurements do not have lower status than those without; they merely find it 
harder to have their status recognized by other human beings. The interests of 
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such people in their possible fulfillment, and the rights they have relating to those 
interests, do not depend on these interests and rights being recognized by anyone 
at all. 
This paper has taken as its premise the organic theory of the person. Whether 
this theory is accepted or rejected, it must be remembered that one of its features 
is the proposition that a human being has objective interests which are morally 
significant. If, as some claim31 , there are objective "human goods" - objective 
modes of human flourishing - our interests will not depend on our taking an 
interest in the goods we may enjoy. A human being will not need to develop this 
or that level of mental or physical ability for his or her fulfillment to have moral 
significance. What is essential will not be the actual possession of such features as 
rationality, but the existence of a being who would be fulfilled in acquiring such 
features. Clearly, our origin as living beings is significant on this view of persons, 
for later abilities will not create, but fulfill, the living person who acquires them. 
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